Imagine a research finding associates a health behavior with positive health outcomes. One result is that new take-up of the behavior is likely larger among people with other positive health behaviors. Such changes in selection will mean later non-randomized analyses may be more biased and may confirm even effects which are initially false positives. These dynamics appear clearly in theory. This paper asks whether they are quantitatively important in empirical settings, and whether standard selection-on-observables adjustments are sufficient to address them. Using data from vitamin supplementation and diet behaviors I show that when behaviors are more recommended they are more commonly undertaken by individuals with higher socioeconomic status and better health. In addition, when behaviors are more recommended they are more strongly associated with positive health outcomes, including survival, weight and heart health. The effects are large and adjustment for selection on observables is insufficient to address the bias. This suggests research findings themselves may endogenously bias observational results.
Introduction
In many domains individuals face recommendations about behaviors -these include, for example, their financial choices or decisions about investments in children. This paper focuses on health recommendations (i.e. take vitamins, eat vegetables, exercise). Adherence to these recommendations varies across individuals; for example, those with more education or income are more likely to engage in "positive" health behaviors (e.g. Berrigan et al, 2003; Friel, Newell and Kelleher, 2005; Finke and Huston, 2003; Kirkpatrick et al, 2012; Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2010; Cutler, Lleras-Muney and Vogel, 2008; Goldman and Smith, 2002) . One result is that it is a challenge to learn about these relationships in observational data, due to problems of omitted variable bias.
This issue is well-known (e.g. Greenland et al, 1999; Vandenbroucke et al, 2007) .
What is less frequently considered is the fact that the selection problem may change over time.
In particular, in the presence of individual behavioral response to health advice, the degree of bias in estimates of these relationships may be endogenous to health recommendations.
To be concrete, consider a hypothetical case in which researchers are evaluating the relationship between pineapple and cardiovascular health and imagine that a particular study finds a small positive relationship between pineapple consumption and low cholesterol. In response to the advice, some people would increase their consumption of pineapple. It is likely that these would be the people who are most concerned about their health. But this group is also likely to be engaged in other cholesterol-lowering behavior. A result of this is that later studies of the pineapple-cholesterol relationship may see the bias in the estimates exacerbated by the increased selection. 1 I begin, in Section 2, by outlining briefly outlining more formal version of this intuition. I develop a utility model in which individuals may invest in costly health behaviors and differ in their overall valuation of health. I show in this model that when the (perceived) health value of a target behavior increases as a result (for example) of a change in recommendation, its covariance with other positive health behaviors and proxies for health valuation also increase. As a result if at least some of the other health behaviors are unobserved the relationship between the target health behavior and health outcomes will vary with recommendations. I note that under this model treatment effects of zero will be especially unstable since false positives or negatives will be self-reinforcing.
The theory develops the possibility of these dynamic biases, which follow directly from general concerns about selection. From the standpoint of evaluating evidence, however, the key questions are: (1) How large are these effects? and (2) To what extent are they mitigated by standard controls? If changes in selection have only minimal impacts on the relationship between health behavior and health outcomes, or these changes are fully addressed by standard controls, then patterns of changing selection may be of academic interest but may not be important in evaluating conclusions about health behaviors.
It is these empirical questions I address in the paper, using data from two contexts: vitamin supplementation (vitamins D and E) and dietary patterns (sugar, saturated fat and the Mediterranean diet).
The data used in the paper is outlined in Section 3; I make use of a number of datasets, including the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey ("NHANES"), the Nielsen HomeScan panel ("HomeScan") and the Nurse Health Study ("NHS").
Vitamin D and E supplements have fallen in and out of fashion over time. In both cases there are periods following positive health studies in which these supplements are more recommended, and periods following cautionary studies in which they are less recommended. This is the most stark in the case of vitamin E, where a pair of studies in the early 1990s suggested they could prevent cancer and then a meta-analysis of randomized trials in 2004 suggested they actually increase mortality.
I begin the analysis of vitamins by showing dynamics in purchasing and consumption of these supplements over time in several datasets. These patterns mimic the movement in recommendations. I then estimate the dynamics in selection. I show that for both vitamins, across several different datasets, consumption of the supplement becomes more positively selected when it is more recommended. These effects are large. For example: prior to the positive health news about vitamin E in the early 1990s, college-educated individuals in the NHANES were 4.6 percentage points more likely to consume this supplement than those with less than a high school education. By the late 1990s, after the recommendation changed, this increased to 13 percentage points. After 2004, when bad news came out, this dropped again to 4.3 percentage points. I see similar dynamics for vitamin D around education and income. I also observe a larger relationship between both vitamin consumption and other health behaviors (exercise, not smoking) when the behavior is more recommended.
Turning to the relationship with outcomes, I find that estimated relationships between vitamin consumption and positive outcomes are also strengthened after the positive recommendation. I can see this first in evidence from published work: for both vitamins, papers which use data collected after the behavior is more recommended are more likely to find a significant impact on cancer prevention. These dynamics are apparent even though the published papers typically adjust for a wide variety of important controls. This suggests that adjusting regressions for observed covariates does not address the bias.
Second, in the NHS I can observe a changing relationship between vitamin E consumption and mortality around the change in recommendation. This effect is large: in the period before 1993 taking vitamin E is associated with an insignificant 10 percent reduction in death risk. After the positive health recommendation, this jumps to a highly significant 20 to 30 percent reduction in the mortality risk. After the negative vitamin E news in 2004, later surveys show the effect of supplementation on mortality is again around 10 percent and not significant. It is not plausible that the true causal effect is varying so much or so quickly.
The second example developed focuses on three dietary patterns: sugar consumption, saturated fat consumption and consumption of a Mediterranean-style diet, each of which have seen changing recommendations over time. In these cases the change are in one direction only, with sugar and fat having more negative recommendation over time and the Mediterranean diet being more recommended.
The analysis of diet uses data from the NHANES alone, but has the advantage that I can observe dietary patterns, selection and the relationship between diet and BMI or heart health all in the same dataset.
As in the case of vitamins, I show adherence to these dietary patterns follows the recommendations over time. In the analysis of selection, I again find that in periods where a given pattern is more (less) recommended the selection with respect to socioeconomic status and other health behaviors becomes more (less) positive.
The health outcomes considered in this case are BMI and heart health. I show that when these behaviors are more recommended, they are more strongly associated with low BMI and better heart health. These effects are, again, large. In the case of sugar, in the earliest period of the data higher sugar consumption is actually associated with a lower BMI. By the latest period of the data it is strongly associated with an increase in BMI. This suggests that the changes in selection are large enough to change not just the magnitude but the sign of the relationship. I argue, again, it is not plausible that the true effect varies this substantially. This echoes the selection patterns: more sugar is associated with higher socioeconomic status in the earlier period and lower socioeconomic status in the later period.
I use regression evidence to show formally that the relationship between dietary choices and socioeconomic status or other health behaviors moves in tandem with the relationship between dietary choices and health outcomes.
In these data I can also more completely evaluate the second central question in the paper: does the common practice of including demographic controls in regressions eliminate these dynamic biases? I find it does not. In fact, including demographic controls in the regressions makes relatively little difference. The large, visible, changes in gradients over time persist, and the coefficients in regressions of one gradient on the other are slightly smaller but still large and highly significant.
Overall, the evidence in these empirical sections suggests that these dynamics are qualitatively important for treatment effect conclusions and that controlling for observed covariates are, at least in these settings, insufficient to address these concerns.
In the last section of the paper I consider whether it is possible to use the change in selection patterns directly to evaluate robustness and generate more plausibly causal estimates. In particular, I combine the analysis here with the idea of proportional selection on observed and unobserved variables (Altonji et al, 2005; Oster, 2018) . I show the multiple selection regimes may provide an opportunity to infer causal effects in this framework. 2 I apply this approach to the analysis of dietary patterns; taken at face value, it points (for example) to robust impact of the Mediterranean diet, but less so for sugar.
The primary contribution of this paper is to extend work on the limits of observational data.
Many authors have noted that observational evidence in health settings often appears biased and may be contradicted by randomized trials (Autier et al, 2014; Maki et al, 2014; Brownlee et al, 2010) .
The results here suggest that the observational observational findings themselves may contribute to the creation of bias. Further, they shed doubt on the ability of standard adjustment-for-observables techniques to address these dynamic biases.
These findings bode especially poorly for our ability to learn about null effects. A true effect of zero will be unstable, as false positives and false negatives will be self-reinforcing. Once a significant result has been obtained in some setting, biases may be enduring until better data (for example, from a randomized trial) is available.
The paper also contributes to a large literature in economics on the relationship between socioeconomic status and adherence to health recommendations (e.g. Berrigan et al, 2003; Friel, Newell and Kelleher, 2005; Finke and Huston, 2003; Kirkpatrick et al, 2012; Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2010; Cutler, Lleras-Muney and Vogel, 2008; Goldman and Smith, 2002) and on consumer response to health information (e.g. Cutler, 2004; Chern et al, 1995; Brown and Schrader, 1990; Chang and Just, 2007; Roosen et al, 2009; Kinnucan et al, 1997; Ippolito and Mathios, 1995) .
Theoretical Framework
In this section I briefly formalize the intuition described in the introduction. The second subsection overlays on this a description of the process of research, and suggests implications for patterns that would arise in the data.
Model of Behavior

Setup
I consider a set of individuals who may undertake any of health behaviors from a vector Λ = (Λ 1 , ..., Λ n ). Assume each behavior Λ j is binary, i.e. Λ ∈ {0, 1} n , with a value of 1 indicating undertaking the behavior. The assumption that behaviors are binary is not principal in this model and is taken for simplicity of exposition. All results would hold if Λ ∈ [0, 1] n instead.
Health behavior j has a health value κ j ≥ 0, and the overall health index h is a linear sum:
The assumption of a linear form introduces weak substitutability of different behaviors; the main results developed here would strengthen if the health behaviors were complements.
Individual i has a cost to undertaking behavior x, c i x . These costs are drawn iid from a normal distribution with mean c x > 0 and variance σ 2
x . This allows for heterogeneity in costs across individuals and average differences across behaviors, but assumes these costs are independent of other characteristics of individuals.
Individual i has a health benefit function: U i = α i h(Λ). This utility varies across individuals in α i . We will define individual i as having a higher health value than individual j if α i > α j . These health values are drawn iid from some arbitrary non-degenerate distribution on R + .
Each individual chooses their optimal value of h, trading off their utility value of health against the cost. For individual i we can write their problem as:
Note that c i k may be zero or negative so individuals may engage in some of these behaviors even if they do not confer health benefits. The individual adopts j if the health benefit of this behavior exceeds its cost:
Under this model, individuals with a higher health value will achieve a higher level of h overall and will undertake more health behaviors on average than those with a lower health value. They will also be more likely to engage in any particular health behavior with a positive health value.
Individuals realize some positive health outcome -say, a healthy weight or good cholesterolwhich is a function of these health behaviors. 3 I assume this outcome is a linear function of at least subset of the health behaviors; we denote this subset Λ (note that it may include all n behaviors) and write
, where all ϑ k > 0 and i is drawn iid.
This structure for outcomes assumes that there is no treatment effect heterogeneity, an assumption which will be important for the results later, which interpret changes in effects over time as reflecting changes in selection. In these contexts, where the effects I posit are biological, the assumption of no or very limited treatment effect heterogeneity may be more appropriate than in some other settings.
Change in Value of Behavior
This paper is primarily concerned with the dynamics that occur when there is a change in the (perceived) value of a behavior. Here, I will develop the simplest case in which a behavior moves from having no perceived health value to having a positive value; in Appendix B I develop the case where the value increases from a positive baseline value.
Consider a behavior A (an element of Λ) which initially has a value κ A = 0 (with a slight abuse of notation let us denote the parameters of the model pertaining to behavior A by subscript A). Note that people may still engage in the behavior at baseline, for example if their cost of undertaking it is negative. Between time t and t + 1 it is announced that κ A = κ A > 0. I will consider two changes between these periods. First, changes in the relationship between behavior A and other behaviors. Second, changes in the relationship between A and health outcome Y . Note that all proofs for the results below appear in Appendix B.
Behavior Selection Dynamics Define a behavior Λ k which is selected such that κ k > 0. That is, this is a behavior which is understood to have health benefits. Recall from the setup above that this behavior is more likely to be undertaken by individuals with a high health value. The first result relates this behavior to behavior A before and after the information change about behavior A.
Proposition 1 For any behavior
The key result in this proposition is that the relationship between the behavior of interest -A -and the other positive health behaviors will strengthen after the change in recommendation.
Increases in the covariance imply A is newly adopted more frequently by those who undertake the other health behavior before change. This result is immediate in this simple case with a baseline κ A equal to zero, since that implies a zero covariance between the behaviors in the baseline period.
In Appendix B I develop the case where there is some initial positive relationship; in this case, the result can reverse if the increase in κ A is very large.
This first proposition links behavior A to other health behaviors. In addition, we can consider the role of other covariates. Specifically, assume that we are able to observe a variable ω, which is positively related to the health value. This is intended to capture a variable like education or income. Similar logic leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 For any random variable ω such that it is independent of c i A and
This indicates that we expect the relationship between behavior A and this metric ω to strengthen after the change in recommendation.
Disease-Behavior Dynamics These above results relate directly to changes in selection. I turn now to the implications for the estimated relationship between behavior A and health outcomes.
Proposition 3 LetΛ be a strict subset of Λ. Suppose that either A is not in Λ or A ∈ Λ\Λ and κ A is small. Then, given the assumption in the setup of no treatment effect heterogenaity, we can derive the following two results:
This says that as the behavior becomes more recommended, and thus the selection on the behavior changes, the estimated effect of the behavior on health outcomes will change. This will be true even if researchers observe and adjust for some of the confounding variables, as long as they do not observe all of them. Note if all elements of Λ were observed and controlled for then it would be possible to estimate the true effect of A on Y in all periods and these effects would not vary over time.
Research Process and Data Implications
The preceding subsection derives conditions under which we would see the dynamics described in the simple example in the introduction. Here, I consider overlaying a research process over these results, and ask how we can look for these patterns in the data.
I consider the research process evaluating the effect of behavior A on outcome Y. It will be helpful to pull out the particular behavior A in the estimating equation for Y and specify the true data generating process as
whereθ andΛ i represent the coefficient and behavior vectors with behavior A removed.
Assume the research process is as follows. In each year, researchers draw a sample of individuals and collect data on behavior A, outcome Y and a set of other variables Φ. This vector Φ may include some elements ofΛ, along with elements of ω (other demographics, etc). Following the data collection, they estimate the effect of A on Y using the feasible equation below, where we have introduced subscripts t to indicate the estimation is specific to a year. Note that β also has a t subscript to indicate that it may not be equal to the true β.
Typically, researchers then report β t .
In the context of this setup, I consider cases where information about the health value of A changes and look for signatures of the above dynamics in the data.
The first set of results focuses on the selection patterns directly. Propositions 1 and 2 highlight the dynamics of the relationship between A, other health behaviors and elements of ω. I use the data to look directly for these changes in selection patterns. I will often refer to the relationship between A and other health behaviors or elements of ω as the "behavior-selection gradient", understanding that this is not a technical use of the term "gradient".
In the second set of results I focus on the time-varying relationship between behavior A and outcome Y. As detailed in Proposition 3, if we cannot observe all elements of Λ, the estimated β t effects will vary over time and, as in Corollary (1) will move with the behavior-selection gradient.
I will refer to the relationship between health and behavior as the "health-behavior gradient", with a similar note on the terminology.
It is important to note that if we observe all the elements ofΛ, or if the demographic controls are sufficient to fully explainΛ, then these latter dynamics will not occur. In that case, we expect the β t coefficients to be the same in each period, and equal to β. In this sense, observing that they are different provides an (indirect) test for whether the included controls fully capture the omitted factors.
Stability Before moving on to the empirical results, it is worth noting that under this model and research process a true treatment effect of zero will be fragile and difficult to sustain; more so than a true positive or negative treatment effect.
To see why, consider the case where the true treatment effect is zero, and imagine that initially selection is minimal so in the population the estimated treatment effect would also be zero. Due to sampling variability, with repeated sample draws 5% of the time the data will yield a significant positive or negative impact. When this happens, under the model above the endogenous behavioral reaction will reinforce that finding. In later periods the feasible estimated treatment effect in the population will be biased, and may not be zero in sample.
In contrast, a true treatment effect that is positive (or, conversely, negative) will be selfreinforcing. We expect a move away from a positive effect (for example) only if the sampling variability in the data generates a significant negative effect despite the true significant positive effect. This will happen strictly less than 2.5% of the time.
Although it is outside the model, these dynamics will be reinforced by publication processes which values non-zero results; in the case with a true treatment effect of zero the published data may disproportionately reflect sampling error. In addition to these target health behaviors, there are three key data elements: additional health behavior measures (Λ k above), covariates which influence the value of health (ω above) and a set of health outcomes (Y above). Below, I detail the key variables and the datasets used.
Data
Key Variables
Health Behavior (Λ k ) The health behaviors in Λ k should be those which are widely considered to be positive health behaviors. I use exercise, not smoking cigarettes and, in the case of vitamins, a metric of overall diet quality. 5 I will consider both the individual behaviors and, in some cases, the first principal component from a factor analysis. 6
Proxies for Health Value (ω) I proxy for health value with socioeconomic status -education and household income. Again I will consider these individually but also focus on a composite measure which is the first principal component of from a factor analysis.
Health Outcomes (Y ) For vitamins, the health outcomes considered are cancer and mortality.
For diet, I use BMI and cardiovascular health. Information on vitamin supplementation is obtained from the vitamin supplement modules. I focus on individual vitamin supplements -that is, is someone taking a single-ingredient Vitamin D or E supplement. Information on diet is generated from the daily dietary recalls in the study. In the case of the Mediterranean diet I generate a Mediterranean diet score as described in Trichopoulou et al (2003) . 7 I extract data on education, income and other demographics from the demographic survey portion of the NHANES. The NHANES also provides a measure of exercise, which I standardize within year, as well as information on smoking behavior.
Data Sources
To study health outcomes, I extract information on cardiovascular health and BMI. I construct an index of heart health based on blood pressure and cholesterol. All of the health measures are collected objectively, based on weighing and measuring the individual, taking blood samples and blood pressure.
Nielsen HomeScan Data
The Nielsen HomeScan panel tracks consumer purchases using at-home scanner technology. Households that are part of the panel are asked to scan their purchases after all shopping trips. The Nielsen data records the UPC of items purchased. Einav, Leibtag and Nevo (2010) These data will be used to look at selection in vitamin purchases over time. They do not contain information on health, and variation in nutrient data coverage over time makes it difficult to analyze diet. However, it is possible to look at vitamins, in particular by generating variables indicating whether the household purchased each vitamin supplement during each year. Information on household education and income can then be used to analyze selection. In addition, I incorporate data on cigarette purchases and an expenditure-based measure of diet quality as metrics of other health behaviors.
Publications
In the analysis of vitamins I also draw information from published work on the relationship between vitamin supplements and cancer. I locate publications in two ways. First, I scrape Pubmed for "Vitamin X and cancer" and extract relevant studies, limiting to studies in journals in the top 20% in terms of impact factor. Second, I extract lists of publications from meta-analyses of these relationships. I focus on observational studies and exclude RCTs. For each original study I then extract information on the treatment (either vitamin D or vitamin E supplementation), the outcome (a type of cancer), the years of data covered in the study, the population characteristics and, importantly, whether the study findings were significant. I focus on significance rather than magnitude because given the varying approaches across studies, and the varying types of cancer, it is difficult to compare magnitudes. In all, the resulting dataset includes 82 studies of vitamin D supplementation, and 83 studies of vitamin E supplementation.
I then allocate studies to time periods based on the timing of the data used in the analysis.
Some studies are allocated in parts to different time periods. For example, if a study includes data from 2005 through 2010, I assign a 50% weight to the period before 2008, and a 50% weight to the period after. I then summarize the (weighted) share of significant cancer reductions across time periods. I residualize results with respect to the type of cancer studied (this does not affect the findings).
Publications lag data, and as a result it is not feasible to look at results from the most recent time periods. In particular, in the case of Vitamin D we do not have data past 2010, and in the case of Vitamin E, we do not have sufficient data past 2004.
Nurses Health Study
Finally, I use data from a panel of nurses, the Nurses Health Study (NHS) , to analyze selection patterns in Vitamin E, in particular, and to link Vitamin E consumption to mortality. The NHS recruited a cohort of approximately 120,000 female nurses in 1976 and conducted by-mail surveys of the cohort every two years. The study is ongoing and response rates are very good. Information is available on dietary patterns, some behavioral characteristics and outcomes, including mortality.
The cohort is described in more detail in Colditz et al (1997) . An Institute of Medicine report (Rosen et al, 2012) suggested the purported benefits of vitamin D were overblown, and media coverage in the same period reinforced this (e.g. Bakalar, 2012a; Kolata, 2012; Balakar, 2012b) .
Vitamin E has gone in and out of fashion even more dramatically. In 1993, a pair of widely covered studies in NEJM cited large benefits of vitamin E in preventing heart disease in men and women (Rimm et al, 1993; Stampfer et al, 1993) . In 2004, however, a similarly widely cited report suggested vitamin E supplementation could actually increase mortality (Miller et al, 2005) . 8 This latter fact was based on randomized controlled trial data, and therefore not affected by the selection biases which had grown over time. 
Selection Responses
To explore changes in selection, I construct selection gradients for each vitamin over time. In each year of the data, I regress a dummy for taking the vitamin supplement on the selection variable (other health behaviors, socioeconomic status), and extract the coefficient. from publications ends before the downtown in both cases we would expect studies using later data to be less frequently significant in both cases. It should be noted that the publications from which these results are drawn typically control extensively for demographics and other variables. This is suggestive evidence that such controls do not (fully) address these dynamic biases.
The second piece of evidence on outcomes comes from the NHS, where I can analyze mortality in the microdata. Echoing the construction of the selection gradients, I construct a mortality gradient by regression a dummy for surviving (at least) two years after the survey round, and regress that survival dummy on vitamin E supplementation, with comprehensive age controls. I divide the resulting coefficients by the average death rate over that period, to reflect the fact that cohort is aging, and so the magnitudes are interpreted as the percent increase in mortality rate.
The resulting values are graphed, over time, in Figure 4 . In the period before 1993 taking vitamin E is associated with an insignificant 10 percent reduction in death risk. After 1993, this jumps to a highly significant 20 to 30 percent reduction in the mortality risk. In 2006, the first survey after the 2004 release of evidence undermining the value of vitamin E, the effect of supplementation on mortality is again smaller (around 10 percent) and not significant.
The evidence supports the dynamic selection hypothesized in the Introduction and Section 2.
Perhaps more importantly, it suggests these dynamics are qualitatively important for empirical conclusions about the relationship between these behaviors and outcomes.
It is important to acknowledge here the central alternative explanation for these findings, which is that the actual effect of these supplements varies over time. This is difficult to test directly, but I believe it is unlikely to be the explanation for what we see in the data. It is difficult to imagine what non-selection based changes over time would explain the large and abrupt swings in, for example, the mortality gradients. At the same time, the selection patterns offer an obvious explanation. (Feart et al, 2009 ). Finally, and most notably, a large randomized trial released in 2013 showed cardiovascular benefits (Estruch et al, 2013) .
It is worth saying that in these cases -unlike the vitamins -the trends in recommendations are generally secular, with sugar and fat becoming less recommended over the course of the period I consider, and the Mediterranean diet becoming more recommended. 
I construct selection gradients as in the vitamin case, again focusing on the socioeconomic status and health behavior factors as the primary selection variables.
The top row of Figure 6 shows the evolution of the factor selection gradients over time. The selection gradients move with the recommendations in all three cases. As in the vitamin case, the results are large. For both sugar and fat the gradient with respect to socioeconomic status actually switches sign over time. In the earliest periods in the data, individuals with higher socioeconomic status (more educated, higher income) eat relatively more sugar and saturated fat. By the latest period in the data, this group consumes substantially less sugar and fat.
Appendix Figures A3, A4 and A5 show the evolution of the gradients with respect to each individual index component. The factor patterns are not driven by any particular element of the index and seem to show up quite consistently across all combinations.
Outcome-Behavior Links
The health outcomes I consider here are weight (measured by BMI) and an index of heart health including metrics of blood pressure and cholesterol. In contrast to the vitamin case, I can observe these measures in the NHANES data directly, so run an analysis that is paralell to the selection analysis. Specifically, I regress the outcome (BMI or heart health) on the treatment (sugar, fat or Mediterranean diet) and record the coefficients in each time period. The second row in Figure 6 shows the evolution of these coefficients for BMI. To generate this, I re-define BMI as negative BMI so the theory would predict this moves in the same direction as the selection changes.
I focus first, in discussing these graphs, on the filled-in series, for which the regression generating the coefficients contain no controls other than age and gender. Although the effects are noisier than in the case of changes in selection, we do see movement in these relationships which are consistnet with changes in selection. For sugar, for example, in the earlier periods greater sugar consumption is actually associated with a lower BMI; in the later period, it is strongly associated with higher BMI. Figure 6 is testing -graphically -the implication of the theory that these gradients move together with the recommendations. It is also possible to test directly whether the gradients move together; this is done in Table 1 . Focusing first on Panel A of the table, where the health-treatment regressions are run with only age and gender controls, the coefficients here test for significant comovement between the selection gradients and the behavior-outcome gradients. In all four casesthe two outcomes and the two different selection measures -I see evidence of co-movement through a significant relationship between the two series.
The evidence in the graph and tables suggests that the changes in the selection of behavior may be driving changes in the estimated relationship between the outcome and treatment in observational data. A natural approach to combating these selection issues is to include controls. In the language of the theory, if we are able to include controls which fully address differences inΛ behavior choices (either by including all elements ofΛ or by including controls that fully capture these differences) then the estimated treatment effects will not move with selection. In that case we would still see the movement in selection gradients, but would not see a parallel movement in the outcome-treatment relationship.
I re-estimate the outcome-treatment regressions including a standard set of demographic controls common in this literature (education, income, race, marital status). The open markers in Figure 6 show these coefficients over time. Including these controls makes very little difference.
The variation over time shrinks slightly with their inclusion, but the basic patterns remain stark.
Panel B of Table 1 shows the co-movement regressions with these controlled coefficients. If the controls were sufficient to fully address the selection bias then we would expect these coefficients to be zero. 9 Instead, they are only slightly smaller than the uncontrolled coefficients, and are highly significant.
This analysis overall suggests that, as in the vitamin case, the selection changes here are large enough to have significant effects on what a researcher would conclude about the relationship between these treatments and outcomes.
Selection on Unobservables Approach
The results above add to general caution in interpreting observational results in settings like this.
The problem of omitted variable bias is well known, but these results suggest such bias may be dynamic and, indeed, may respond to research findings. This suggests that awareness of the changes in recommendations over time should inform discussions about the plausible degree of bias in estimates.
In this section I consider the possibility that this dynamic selection also presents an opportunity.
Specifically, these changes in selection could be used, along with a framework linking the selection on observed versus unobserved variables, to obtain better estimates of causal effects. This may be an approach to robustness in situations where selection varies over time. Below, I briefly formalize this framework and then show an example of these calculations in the context of dietary patterns.
I note this is a particular but by no means the only approach to using multiple selection regimes to infer these effects. An alternative, closely related, would rely on a Heckman selection framework (e.g. Heckman, 1978) again using multiple time periods to pin down causal parameters.
Framework
I return to the framework in Section 2. I modify slightly by defining Λ i =θΛ i + i and rewriting the full equation for Y as
Effectively this means Λ is a factor equal to the full vector of behaviors multiplied by their true coefficients, and the noise term. We can think of this as assuming the noise term is a "health behavior", or assuming there is no true "noise" in health determination. 10 In Section 2 I described Φ -the control set -as containing some elements of Λ and ω. I now explicitly defineΛ as the vector of omitted factors, namely the residual from a regression of Λ on Φ. We can rewrite the full equation as
where Π is the coefficient on Φ in a regression of Λ on Φ. The feasible estimating equation is
It is straightforward to see, by standard omitted variable bias logic, thatβ is (possibly) biased and, in particular, thatβ = β + This describes a relationship between the selection on the observed factors (ΠΦ) and the unobserved factor (Λ). As noted in the original work, this is a very strong assumption. In this context, the assumption would be delivered (for example) if the set of behaviors we observe is a random subset of all of the behaviors. Intuitively, work which uses this assumption tends to defend it by arguing 10 The reason to redefine in this way is that when I move to the proportional selection adjustment below, this eliminates a free parameter (the maximum R-squared in the full regression). Given the estimation approach here, this is without loss of generality since this parameter is jointly determined with the degree of proportionality. This approach echos the setup in Altonji et al (2005) .
the observed controls are a noisy proxy for the unobserved ones, which connects this directly to other formulations which rely more directly on this noise (e.g. Pei, Pischke and Schwandt, 2018).
The existing work shows that β is a function of δ and a vector X of parameters from the data (including controlled and uncontrolled regression coefficients and R-squared values). 11 The existing work imagines a single estimation, and that authors will combine the observed elements of X with an assumption about δ to comment on robustness of β.
In this case, however, we have observed multiple X vectors, under varying selection regimes.
With an assumption of constant β and δ over time, we can write:
This is an identified system of equations and it implies one can infer the true β from the data by using the changes in selection. With more than two periods, the system is over-identified (since there will still be two unknowns -β and δ -but more than two equations).
A key caveat here is that this relies crucially on the assumption that β and δ are constant over time and that there is no treatment effect heterogeneity in β. This is best understood as an exploratory or robustness exercise, rather than an alternative approach to inferring causality. This could be useful, for example, in meta-analytic approaches which rely on data from multiple time periods with differential selection. This approach adds to other approaches which incorporate additional information from the data to discipline this selection on unobservables approach to robustness (e.g. Finkelstein, Gentzkow and Williams, 2018) .
Implementation and Results
To implement, I focus on the three dietary patterns in the data. Broadly, the approach here is to ask what values of δ and, more importantly, β, are most consistent with the observed data.
For each treatment I aggregate individual years into two (fat and Mediterranean diet) or three (sugar) periods. 12 By aggregating I increase the precision of this analysis but maintain the differ-11 In Oster (2018) the results are developed under the assumption of noise in the data generating equation for Yi and therefore contain an additional calibration parameter, Rmax, which is the hypothetical R-squared in the true regression. We abstract away from that here by assuming no error. In practice, δ and Rmax are not individually identified and separating them is useful since it is easier to develop intuition about their values, but for the purposes here that is not relevant.
12 I divide into periods based on a visual sense of the number of different "regimes" in the data. The results here suggest some significant effects, although they are more limited in many cases than would be implied by the most optimistic yearly estimates. Increases in sugar consumption do appear to reduce heart health measures, but do not impact obesity or BMI. The Mediterranean diet has the most consistent effects after adjustment. This table also makes clear some of the less ideal features of this approach -for example, in a couple of cases the implied effects are very different than any of the controlled effects, which is probably not realistic. Nevertheless, it is perhaps comforting that the Mediterranean diet -the only diet pattern among these with support in randomized controlled trials -is the most consistent after the adjustment.
Again, given the strength of the assumptions required here I will stop well short of suggesting this as an primary approach to causality. However, it may prove to be a useful robustness tool.
Conclusion
In this paper I analyze the role of health behavior change in driving the selection features of health behaviors. I outline a simple data generating process in which changes in health recommenda-tions differentially change health behaviors for different groups and show that these changes may influence estimated relationships between behavior and health over time. Using data on vitamin supplementation and diet I demonstrate that these dynamics occur in data. The degree of selection in behaviors varies over time, and the relationship between behavior and health also varies with these changes in selection. These dynamics are quantitatively important.
This paper focuses on health behaviors and health outcomes, but the dynamics here may be present in other settings (parental behaviors, for example) where individual choices vary over time.
The approach here may apply in those setting as well.
In the results here, on vitamins in particular, we also see some hint of how these dynamics can be disciplined by better evidence. In the case of Vitamin E, the research that urged caution on consumption was a meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials. By this point in time the observational data was quite biased in favor of vitamin E, but randomized data is not subject to these biases.
As a final note, the logic in this paper may relate to a broader literature -in economics and elsewhere -on technology adoption (e.g. Griliches, 1957; Skinner and Staiger, 2005) . This literature often discusses an S-curve in adoption, with initially slow adoption, then a period of faster adoption, and then an asymptote to full adoption. An open question in many settings is why some users adopt first -one possibility is that the driver of earlier adoption is general knowledge or selection (e.g.
Strang and Soule 1998); a second is that the users with the largest benefits adopt first (e.g. Hall and Kahn, 2003) . The first of these explanations is parallel to the claims made here. If this first explanation is correct, the link between outcomes and technology adoption should grow initially as the technology is first adopted. If, on the other hand, initial adoption is driven by larger benefits, we should observe the link between technology and outcomes is everywhere decreasing as adoption moves forward. This may suggest a way to provide some insight into the right explanation in these settings.
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Vitamin E−Health Behavior Gradients Over Time
Notes: These figures show the evolution of selection in vitamin consumption or purchase behavior over time. The selection variables are socioeconomic status (first principal component of education and income) and health behaviors (for NHANES: first principal component of exercise, smoking and diet quality; for HomeScan: first principal component of smoking, diet quality; for NHS: smoking). Events are marked with vertical lines; details of the events appear in Appendix Table A1 . . * indicates significance at the 5% level. Notes: These figures show the share of significant vitamin-cancer relationships in published work using data from each period. Publications are identified from Pubmed searches and from published meta-analyses. The outcome (significant negative relationship between vitamin supplementation and cancer) is residualized with respect to the type of cancer. Studies with data which overlaps the time periods is assigned a partial weight in each time period. Notes: This figure shows the estimated impact of vitamin E consumption on two-year mortality in the Nurse Health Study data over time. Regressions in each period include age fixed effects. Gradients are scaled as a share of the average death rates so can be interpreted as a percent decrease in death rate as a result of reported vitamin E consumption. Events are marked with vertical lines; details of the events appear in Appendix Table A1 . . * indicates significance at the 5% level. Notes: These graphs show the evolution of selection gradients over top (top 3 graphs) and the evolution of the relationship between weight and these treatments over time. STOPEvents are marked with vertical lines; details of the events appear in Appendix Table A1 . . * indicates significance at the 5% level. In Panel B these also include controls for race, marital status, education and income. * indicates significance at the 10% level, * * indicates significance at the 5% level, * * * indicates significance at the 1% level. (Oster, 2018) . In each case we solve for the implied δ and causal impact β under the assumption of proportional selection. The calculations are made using a grid search; details are in Section 6. Standard errors on β are based on a bootstrap with 1000 replications. * indicates significance at the 10% level, * * indicates significance at the 5% level, * * * indicates significance at the 1% level. Heavily covered in media.
Appendix A: Figures and Tables
Very large Google trend spike.
Notes: This table shows the information events identified for each outcome. Events were identified by searching for well-cited publications, media coverage and Google search spikes. 
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 (Baseline Case) At time t, if κ A = 0, then whether subject i undertakes A is solely determined by c i A , which is independent of Λ k . Thus,
Given that the costs are normally distributed and independent, denoting by Φ the cdf of the standard normal distribution, and using the law of iterated expectations, we obtain:
, where all expectations are taken with respect to health value α i .
Note, that on this step we used the fact that both behaviors are independent conditionally on α i , which is granted by the linear form.
The right hand side of the inequality has the form of
Given that α i is not degenerate, by the covariance inequality this value is positive. Hence,
Remarks for Proposition 1 (Initially Positive κ A ) What happens to the covariance between A and Λ k if at time t we have κ A > 0, and at time t + 1, κ A increases?
, as was shown previously in the proof or Proposition 1.
Let's find the derivative of the covariance at time t with respect to κ A . By the dominated convergence theorem we can interchange the derivative with the expectation.
, where φ is the pdf of the standard normal distribution.
At κ A = 0 this derivative is positive by the covariance inequality. Thus, Cov t (A, Λ k ) is increasing inκ A in the vicinity of 0 (in other words, for small κ A ). > 0 and decreases afterwards. Note that α * decreases in κ A and it goes to 0 as κ A goes to infinity. Thus, for large initial κ A , function φ(
Note that φ(
decreases for almost all values of α i . Hence, applying the covariance inequality again, ∂Covt(A,Λ k ) ∂κ A < 0 for sufficiently large κ A . This implies that the covariance between the behaviors decreases in κ A for large κ A . Nonetheless, the covariance always remains positive. Intuitively, if κ A is very large, then almost all agents should undertake this behavior. A becomes almost surely constant (equal to 1) as κ A goes to infinity, and hence its covariance with other behaviors goes to 0. On the other hand, if κ A is small, then few agents undertake it (almost independently of α i ). In this case, a marginal increase in κ A leads to increased sensitivity of this behavior to the individual health value α i , through which the covariance with Λ k increases. If we consider large changes in κ A in this case, then the effect is ambiguous in general.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Covariance with Other Variables) We assume that ω is independent of c i A . Since at time t we have κ A = 0, then A only depends on c i A . Hence, Cov t (A, ω) = 0. Now we will show that Cov t+1 (A, Λ k ) > 0.
Similarly to the main proof, to establish the positive covariance between the variables at time t + 1 we use the law of iterated expectations and the fact that conditionally on α i , A and ω are independent.
Cov t+1 (A, Λ k ) = E(Φ(
The assumption of increasing E[ω|α i ] and the covariance inequality yield the result. 
Proof of Proposition 3 (Disease-Behavior Dynamics) (A)
)) 2 . Thus, it is possible that the variance of A decreases from t to t + 1. If κ A is very large at time t + 1, almost everyone adopts it, so V ar t+1 (A) ≈ 0.
Thus, in the case when A affects the health outcome, the covariance between A and Y can decrease due to a decrease in the variance of A.
However, this will not happen if κ A is relatively small. To see this let us find the derivative of V ar t+1 (A) with respect to κ A .
By the dominated convergence theorem,
. At κ A = 0 this is equal to φ( ) for r = c. This is the same formula as in the proof of Proposition 1. The difference here is that all expectations are taken with respect to α i conditionally on Λ c .
Since the result of Proposition 1 did not depend on a particular distribution of α i , then Cov t+1 (A, Λ r |Λ c ) > 0.
Obviously, Cov t+1 (A, Λ c |Λ c ) = 0. Thus, Cov t+1 (A, Y |Λ c ) ≥ 0 and the inequality is strict if Λ c is not the only behavior in Λ i .
Similarly, when we control for several behaviorsΛ, which form a strict subset of Λ i , we obtain where Cov t+1 (A, Λ r |Λ) ≥ 0 with strict inequality if Λ r is not inΛ. Thus, we have the same issue as in (A): the variance of A can decrease at time t + 1, decreasing the covariance between A and Y , which is now taken conditionally onΛ.
Note that conditionally on α i , all behaviors are independent, and that the argument in (A) did not rely on any particular distribution of α i . Using the same argument, we obtain that
